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Abstract 
As Ghana enters its second half century, we are faced with a paradox. Despite a solid 
transition to democracy in the political situation, despite recorded recovery in the last 
fifteen years from the economic malaise of the two decades preceding, and despite 
reductions in measured poverty, there is widespread perception of failure of the economic 
and political system in delivering improving living standards to the population. This essay 
introduces a volume of papers that call for a deeper examination of the macro level data on 
growth and on poverty. A sectoral and regional disaggregation reveals weaknesses in the 
levels and composition of private investment, in the generation of employment, in sectoral 
diversification, and in the distribution of the benefits of growth. At the same time, the push 
for decentralization and for better allocation, monitoring and implementation of public 
expenditure has raised more questions than it has answered. These are the challenges that 
Ghana faces if it is to fulfill the bright promise of its independence in 1957. The papers in 
this volume set out an analytical agenda that we hope will help in laying the ground work 
for the path that the nation’s policy makers will have to steer on the road to 2057. 
                                                 
*Introduction to a forthcoming volume, Ernest Aryeetey and Ravi Kanbur (editors), The Economy of Ghana: 
Analytical Perspectives on Stability, Growth and Poverty, James Currey. The papers were selected from those 
presented at the “Ghana at the Half Century” conference organized by the Institute of Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research, University of Ghana, and Cornell University. We are grateful to USAID for financial 
support through its SAGA project. 
1. Introduction 
 
Ghana will see its first half century as an independent nation in 2007. The early promise of 
democracy combined with economic and social development that hailed the new era in 
1957 led to disappointments in the first three decades. While democracy has now been 
restored, with the peaceful transfer of one civilian administration to another in 2001, and 
while there has been some recovery from the earlier economic collapse, the challenge of 
economic and social transformation looms large. 
 
Indeed, the last two decades have seen steady and significant economic growth in spite of 
considerable instability in macroeconomic performance and a growing dependence on aid 
and other foreign inflows. An average of 4.9% GDP growth and a per capita GDP growth 
of about 2.9% have been recorded for the best part of that period. While the growth 
performance may not be exceptional this has been significantly above average by African 
standards. In their study of the “Drivers of Change” in Ghana, Booth et al. (2004) identify 
economic liberalisation in the 1980s and political liberalisation in the 1990s as the key 
factors behind the fairly decent growth performance. It is important to observe that since 
2001, the macroeconomic policy situation has improved considerably, and the environment 
is less subject to policy reversals and deviations from agreed policies 
 
But the relationship between economic growth and the most important social concern, 
poverty, has been unclear. The perception is that the number of people living below the 
poverty line has not changed in tandem. Thus, despite the sustained per capita growth 
accompanied by some measured reduction in income poverty, levels of poverty remain 
high. The reduction in income poverty has been fairly reasonable and the changes in the 
non-income dimensions are not insignificant. But there are indications also that there have 
been significant movements in and out of poverty and the perception that poverty is 
worsening prevails strongly (Oduro et al. 2004). Most important, the ability of the economy 
to generate employment has definitely not been strengthened after economic reforms in 
which private investments have hardly been significant. In the final analysis, the perception 
that social conditions have not improved significantly in twenty years is quite strong.  
 
Related to the issue of growth and poverty is the question of structural change throughout 
this period. In the policy discussions of the last few years there has been the question of 
how an economy that has been able to achieve fairly decent growth rates over a long period 
remains unable to sustain that achievement with acceptable changes in its structure. It is not 
clear that this is simply a consequence of the chosen macroeconomic policies and their 
implementation, even though these clearly have contributed to the situation. There is the 
growing view that the absence of structural change is the result of there being no clear 
direct effort to achieve such change (Aryeetey and McKay 2004). And the absence of the 
commitment to this change is considered to be largely political (Killick 2000, 2005). 
 
The political transformation that Ghana has experienced, resulting in the historic transfer of 
power from one elected government to another, is definitely significant. While governance 
issues are still considered to be problematic, there is increasing openness in the discussion 
of economic policy. This is reflected by the institution of the annual national economic 
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dialogue and the growing participation of civil society in policy discussions1. Like 
economic reforms, the process of democratisation has been encouraged by donor agencies 
and governments. There is always the danger of having a political reform process that is 
dominated by external influences. But we recognize the fact that there have been some 
domestic influences also. Indeed the need for democratic institutions and the process for 
achieving them have been both demand driven and highly popular (Booth et al. 2004). In 
effect powerful domestic concerns played useful roles alongside the external pressures in 
assisting the process of change.  
 
Analyses of the economy’s more recent performance indicate that despite the relative 
macroeconomic stability achieved, private investment has not responded to this, 
employment has contracted, and agricultural performance outside of cocoa and key export 
crops has been poor (ISSER 2004). Many studies have identified a number of key areas 
that need to be addressed. These include (i) discipline in control of the fiscal deficit through 
effective public expenditure management; (ii) the development of an efficient and 
competitive financial sector which can meet the needs of a developing private sector (iii) 
enhanced effectiveness of public service delivery; and (iv) policies to transform the 
agricultural sector, beginning with the land tenure question.  All of these involve difficult 
political choices and institutional reform (Booth et al.. 2004).     
 
The problem with the fiscal deficit and its management has attracted considerable attention 
from analysts over the years. The central issue has been the trade-off between fiscal deficits 
and growth. Reducing the fiscal deficit has often been seen to be important in enabling 
lower inflation and interest rates, and more real exchange rate stability. And these are all 
important for private sector production and investment. It is important that the stability of 
these key variables is perceived to be permanent and institutionalized in order to have 
beneficial macroeconomic impacts. When the credibility of government, in terms of 
maintaining an appropriate fiscal stance is judged to be very weak, particularly given the 
influence of elections on levels of public spending, this poses a problem for reform. It is 
still not clear if Ghana is out of the woods despite more impressive fiscal balances since 
2001. Indeed improvements have often been due to larger than expected external inflows, 
and lately some improvements in revenue collection. Thus, in 2004 there was a higher than 
expected outturn for receipts. Total receipts, including donor grants, foreign loans and 
HIPC relief for 2004 amounted to ¢28,736.8 billion, which was about ¢3,883.7 billion 
above the budget projection of ¢24,853.1 billion. Domestic resources made up 67.1% of 
this figure with donor assistance contributing the remaining 32.9%. Disbursements and 
external grants reached a record level of ¢4,940.3 billion, equivalent to 6.2% of GDP in 
2004. (See Table 1.1) 
                                                 
1 In May 2001, a workshop organized by the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 
University of Ghana and Cornell University led to the issue of a memorandum on “Economic Growth, 
Macroeconomic Stability and Poverty Reduction” by 40 independent economists as input for the National 
Economic Dialogue for that year. 
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Table 1.1: Performance of the Ghanaian Economy, 2003-2004 
Selected Economic Indicators 
Indicator 2003 2004 2004 Diffe-
rence
Diffe-
rence
(% unless otherwise stated) Actual 
(C1) 
Target 
(C2) 
Actual 
(C3) C3-C1 C3-C2 
National GDP 
       Nominal GDP (¢ billion)  65,262 77,620 79,803.714,541.70 2,183.70 
       Real GDP Growth  5.2 5.2 5.8 0.60 0.60 
       Real Per Capita GDP Growth 2.5 2.7 0.2  
Sectoral Growth Rates   
       Agriculture 6.1 6.0 7.5 1.40 1.50 
       Industry 5.1 5.2 5.1 0.00 -0.10 
       Services 4.7 4.7 4.7 0.00 0.00 
Fiscal Indicators   
       Domestic Revenue/GDP 21.4 22.4 23.8 2.40 1.40 
       Domestic Expenditure/GDP 18.8 20.7 23.7 4.90 3.00 
       Tax Revenue/GDP 19.6 20.9 21.8 2.20 0.90 
       Primary Balance/GDP 2.5 1.7 0.7 -1.80 -1.00 
       Overall Balance/GDP -3.4 -1.7 -3.2 0.20 -1.50 
       Net Domestic Financing/GDP -0.004 -2.2 0.5 0.50 2.70 
Monetary/Financial Indicators   
       Broad Money Supply Growth 35.6 26.0 -9.60  
       Reserve Money Growth 28.2 18.77 -9.43  
       M2+/GDP 0.3 0.34 0.04  
       Inflation (Year-on-Year) 23.6 10 11.8 -11.80 1.80 
       Inflation (Yearly Average) 26.7 17 12.6 -14.10 -4.40 
       Interest Rates   
          Demand Deposits (Annual Av.) 8.5 7.50 -1.00  
          Savings Deposits (Annual Av.) 11.1 9.50 -1.60  
          Time Deposits (Annual Av.) 14.3 13.25 -1.05  
          Lending Rates (Annual Av.) 34.9 28.75 -6.15
          91-Day Bills (End Period) 18.7 17.0 -1.70  
          Lending Rates (End Period) 32.8 28.75 -4.05  
       Depreciation (¢ /$)   
          Inter-Bank  Rate 8,852.30 9,051.26 198.96  
          Forex Bureau Rate 9,130.43 9,222.73 92.30  
External Sector Indicators ($ Millions) 
Merchandise Exports  
2063.9 2314.0 2297.1 487.50 2,784.60
Merchandise Imports  2705.1 3168.1 2969.3 -7,266.60 -4,297.30
Trade Balance  -641.2 -854.1 -672.2 -840.40 -1,512.60
Current Account  15.6 -130.9 40.8 -276.50 -235.70
Balance of Payments  39.8 -76.9 367.3 -367.30 0.00
Gross International Reserves  (GIR) 601.2 811.0 1425.6 16,306.40 17,732.00
GIR in Months of Imports 2.5 2.2 3.9 -0.10 3.80
Net International Reserves  130.86 130.0 657.7 196.00 984.54
Source: Bank of Ghana and Budget Statements 
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The financial sector and what it can do in order to generate investment by the private sector 
has also been the subject of considerable study over the years (Aryeetey 1996). The 
reforms in the sector have not led to significant restructuring, thus leaving the sector 
incapable of leading private sector development. While the problems of the sector are 
partially related to the fiscal problems already mentioned, there are also indications that the 
inability to develop more innovative and competitive approaches to dealing with demand 
for financial services is another major obstacle. What is crucial is for the sector to respond 
to the changing environment in order to make a more meaningful impact on growth and 
development.  
 
Dissatisfaction with public service delivery has been at the core of assessments made by 
many donor agencies on the difficulties of the Ghanaian economy (Aryeetey and Peretz 
2005). That explains the frequent calls by donors for public sector reform, which they 
consider to be a key requirement for raising the growth rate. While such a reform is 
generally politically sensitive, the expected poverty impact, as more poor people benefit 
from improved service delivery and better public expenditure management, is judged to be 
immense.  Previous attempts at civil service reform are judged to have been largely 
unsuccessful due to lack of political support [Booth et al. (2004)]. It is clear however that 
in the absence of major public sector reform the constraints on private sector development 
will remain. But in the absence of private sector investment and also financial sector 
development there appears to be little scope for significant employment creation. 
 
Structural transformation is closely associated with agriculture and its relationship to the 
more modern sectors. Various studies have illustrated the low productivity associated with 
Ghanaian agriculture and provided explanations for this (Seini and Nyanteng 2000). Aside 
from the technological problems that have been linked to the little application of capital in 
agricultural production, there are the issues of land tenure arrangements which do not 
provide adequate incentive for injecting capital into agriculture and other structural and 
institutional problems. There is the general perception that the political transformation that 
has been observed in Ghana has not necessarily facilitated the development of institutions 
that make structural transformation feasible. The politics behind winning elections is not 
necessarily one that promotes efficiency in public service delivery and supports difficult 
land tenure reforms. 
 
As policy makers have struggled to identify the most practical ways of bringing about 
improvements in policy and its implementation, so also has it become necessary to 
encourage researchers to provide information on the state of the economy and views on 
what policies and institutional developments would be most appropriate for tackling the 
problems identified. This essay is an introduction to a volume of papers that seek to 
achieve this objective. Based on these papers and on the literature in general, it provides an 
overview of economic stability, growth and poverty in Ghana as the nation enters its 
second half century. 
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2.  Growth and Macroeconomic Performance 
 
As seen earlier, macroeconomic conditions in Ghana have been relatively stable since 
2001, even if somewhat mixed for a number of indicators. This stability contrasts quite a 
bit with performance in the decade before it. In 2004, two of the five ‘key macroeconomic 
targets’ were met, namely real GDP growth and gross international reserves. The targets set 
for the domestic primary balance, inflation and the overall budget deficit were not 
achieved. But more important is the fact, that to a very large extent the performance is still 
driven largely by external factors. In that sense, not much has changed after almost five 
decades of independence. 
 
The Growth Record 
 
Fig.1.1 shows how growth rate appears to have settled around the 5% level for two decades 
with some improvement in 2004 at 5.8%. As in the past few years, the growth has been led 
by the agriculture sector which grew by 7.5% in 2004 compared to 6.1% in 2003. The 
sector contributed 46.7% of overall 2004 growth which may be compared to 41.4% in 
2003.  Cocoa was the driving force in the sector’s growth with a 29.9% increase in the sub-
sector. The industrial sector grew by 5.1% contributing 22.1% to overall growth in 2004. 
The highest growth in the industrial sector came from construction which experienced a 
6.6% growth, having risen from 6.1% in 2003. The services sector grew by 4.7%, 
contributing 24.3% to overall growth.  
 
But there is a sometimes traumatic history to the growth story. We have suggested that over 
the past two decades Ghana’s fairly decent growth performance has compared favourably 
with that in many other sub-Saharan African countries. This has been achieved in an 
environment that was often unstable and which then impacted on households in a manner 
that was different from expected. Aryeetey and Fosu (2005) present that growth 
experience. The growth record shows considerable unevenness, particularly in the 1970s. 
With a reasonably high GDP growth in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Ghanaian economy 
began to experience a slowdown in GDP growth in 1964. Growth was turbulent during 
much of the period after the mid-1960s and only began to stabilise by 1984.  There have 
been several years of negative growth and these were often years that saw changes in 
government and often with explosive policy changes or reversals.  The lowest ever growth 
of -14% was experienced in 1975, coinciding with the oil-price shock, as well as a policy 
reversal from a market-oriented stance to an inward-looking protectionist regime. The 
period of turbulence, however, also had positive growth episodes, with the highest peak 
rate reaching 9% in 1970 and 1978.   
 
 
 
 6
      Fig. 1.1 Real GDP and Real Per Capita GDP Growth (1970-2004) 
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The significance of policy regimes to the growth performance has depended, to a large 
extent, on how those policies led to the infusion of new capital into the economy. 
Significant growth was recorded in the early 1960s under import-substitution policies so 
long as the state could find the resources to invest. In the 1980s, the liberal reform 
programme or Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), with major support from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, was intended to halt the 
downward economic spiral. Starting in 1986, the second phase of reform saw ERP being 
supplemented with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), geared toward correcting 
a number of structural imbalances in order to engender a sustained healthy economic 
growth. The economy definitely responded positively to ERP/SAP soon after inception. It 
recovered from its negative growth rate of about 5% in 1983 to a hefty positive rate of 8% 
in 1984. The favourable growth has continued since that time, with relatively little 
variance, even if there was a slight slowdown in the rate of growth since the mid 1990s, 
and a little faster growth since 2001. 
 
The growth record, based on per capita income, is similar to that of the GDP. Indeed per 
capita GDP growth closely tracks that of GDP, suggesting that population growth has been 
rather stable, though the larger gap between them since the 1980s suggests an acceleration 
of population growth over this period.  
  
Sustained economic growth would normally be accompanied by major structural 
transformation of the economy. The current and historical pattern of the Ghanaian economy 
portrays hardly any structural changes. This is also supported by the analysis of Killick 
(2000) and of Round and Powell (2000). The structure of the economy in the 1990s 
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indicated a shift in dominance from agriculture to services, with little change in the share of 
industry. 
 
Growth in an Unstable Environment 
 
Aryeetey and Fosu (2005) offer explanations about why the measured growth in Ghana 
often raised questions in the minds of the people. They do this by showing that most of the 
growth has been driven by public investments of questionable productivity, the returns on 
which have been sometimes misallocated. Aryeetey and Tarp (2000) had earlier argued that 
the growth of the 1980s came about as a result of the expansion of capital application, 
largely as a consequence of increased aid inflows, which was similar to the expansion that 
occurred in the 1960s financed largely through accumulated reserves from the 1950s. In 
both cases the increased use of capital was not accompanied by significant improvements 
in total factor productivity. In both instances, the injection of capital came after long 
periods of relatively high capital depreciation. Again in both instances, the initial high 
growth rates could not be sustained into the medium-term because the policies were not 
anchored in appropriate all-embracing development frameworks. The first attempt sought 
to deny the market its place while the second attempt was with weakened state structures 
that were unable to deliver outcomes in a timely and adequate manner. 
 
Aryeetey and Fosu (2005) utilize the growth accounting results presented in O'Connell and 
Ndulu (2000) for the decomposition of per capita growth in Ghana during 1960-97 which 
showed that during the entire 1960-97 period, output per worker declined by 0.12%. At the 
same time, growth in factor accumulation, measured by physical capital per worker, 
accounted for 0.52%, and education per worker for 0.50%; however, this positive 
contribution by physical and human capital was more than offset by the negative 
contribution of total factor productivity (TFP), measured as the residual, of 1.15%. Thus, 
overall, the slow rate of per capita income growth in Ghana over 1960-1997 seems to be 
largely attributed to productivity rather than to production inputs.  
 
It would appear that in the last two decades, the most unstable macroeconomic 
environment was in the 1990s and this is reflected by the discussions of Youngblood and 
Franklin (2005). They note that despite the modest but steady economic growth throughout 
the 1990’s, the monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies were inconsistent with one 
another. The fundamental problem, they argue, was the failure of the government to rein in 
spending and bring deficits down to levels that could be comfortably financed. Many 
public sector expenditures, including Bank of Ghana’s quasi-fiscal activities and the 
operations of state-owned enterprises occurred outside the purview of central government, 
as public sector expenditures averaged nearly 27% of GDP for 1990-2000 while revenue 
from all sources averaged only 20%. Instead of running a much smaller primary deficit to 
be consistent with the exchange rate policy adopted in late 1997, Youngblood and Franklin 
(2005) argue that government continuously run large deficits that had to be financed by 
printing money, borrowing domestically, and borrowing externally. According to them 
excessive reliance on the first two sources resulted in bouts of inflation, exchange rate 
depreciation, and high nominal and real interest rates. 
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The inconsistency between monetary and fiscal policies reached its peak in 1997 with the 
decision to adopt the exchange rate as the nominal anchor without the fiscal restraint 
needed to support such a policy. The result was a speculative assault and a real depreciation 
of such a magnitude (174% nominal, 106% real) that Ghana was forced to seek relief under 
the HIPC program. Youngblood and Franklin (2005) argue that policy makers should have 
seen the risks that were increasing the likelihood of a speculative assault considering the 
availability of extensive economic literature. 
 
Ghana exhibited many of the risk factors that were present in these crises: a weak financial 
system overexposed to foreign liabilities (e.g. borrowing to service external debt); 
constraints on the central bank’s ability to respond to shocks and defend its policies; and a 
monetary policy that was inconsistent with the fiscal realities. The monetary and exchange 
rate policies of the BOG had created large and persistent deviations from interest rate parity 
that resulted in abnormally high returns to holders of domestic T-bills. These returns were 
so high that they could not possibly be expected to last. Ultimately, Youngblood and 
Franklin (2005) explain that market forces, especially in the foreign exchange market, 
accounted for the adjustments. 
 
Interest in the macro environment that has fostered the growth experiences described is 
strong and varied in terms of focus. Using Ghana as a case study, Kyereme (2005) 
examines the determinants of per person real output growth (a measure of economic 
growth), exchange rate volatility, and price inflation--and their interactions and 
implications for economic development--using vector auto regression models. He argues 
that while inflation leads to a weakening cedi, a declining cedi may only in part cause 
inflation because physical and human capital constraints (and sub-optimal levels of 
complementary investments in infrastructure, research and development, etc.) hamper real 
output growth, as dynamic interrelationships between output and inflation are mostly 
insignificant. Hence, effective management of macroeconomic policies that relax the input 
constraints through time can lead to real output responding robustly to price and monetary 
shocks. 
 
Arguing that in the long run, money’s role exceeds that of price, Kyereme (2005) suggests 
that as Ghana’s economy modernizes financially, access to bank credit must be improved 
(e.g. via innovative micro-finance schemes) for the majority rural population, most of 
whom rely on the informal sector for scarce credit at very high interest rates such that 
policies to combat inflation must restrain excessive money supply growth.  Kyereme 
concludes that fiscal discipline and macroeconomic policies which boost per person real 
output growth can dampen inflation and strengthen the cedi.    
 
Considering that the foreign exchange market is one that has seen considerable volatility, 
its effects on trade are certainly important. Agbola (2005) traces and examines the impact 
of devaluation on the trade balance of Ghana from the 1970s to 2002 using the Johansen 
MLE multivariate co-integration procedure as well as the Stock-Watson dynamic OLS 
model (DOLS) to determine the relations between key determinants of Ghana’s trade 
balance. In view of the fact that very few studies have assessed the impact of devaluation 
on Ghana’s economy in recent times, Agbola argues from the premise that devaluation will 
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not succeed in improving Ghana’s trade balance. Aside from serving as the death knell of 
most governments in post-colonial Ghana, his empirical results suggest that devaluation 
does not improve the trade balance of Ghana in the long run as the response in the trade 
balance to movements in the exchange rate appear to be characterised by an M-curve 
phenomenon. Specifically, the results indicate that trade balance and the key determinants 
are non-stationary in levels; the Johansen MLE multivariate co-integration procedure 
suggests that Ghana’s trade balance and key determinants were cointegrated, and thus share 
a long-run equilibrium relationship. The Stock-Watson dynamic OLS (DOLS) modeling 
shows that the key determinants of Ghana’s trade balance are real domestic and foreign 
income, domestic and foreign interest rates, nominal exchange rate, and real foreign money 
supply. Lastly the results of this study indicate that devaluation of the cedi worsens the 
trade balance in the long run.  To offset these problems, Agbola suggests the imposition of 
restrictions on less essential imports and foreign exchange movements, cutting back on 
government spending, and a deregulation of the labour market.    
 
 
3.  Sectoral Developments 
 
The dominance of the agricultural sector in the economy of Ghana ensures that nearly 40% 
of GDP and 50% of all employment are derived from the sector. Agriculture’s growth rate 
lagged behind the other sectors in most of the reform years, however, and this was largely 
due to inefficient farming practices, a strong dependence on rain-fed agriculture and poor 
transport and distribution channels. This trend however saw some reversal in 2003 when 
agriculture once again became the fastest growing sector.   
 
Table 1.2: Sectoral Distribution of Real GDP (Period Averages (%)) 
Sector 1970-75 1976-82  1983-86 1987-90 1991-95 1995-2000 
Agriculture   52   51    52   46   42 39.5 
Industry    19   17       12     14   14 27.5 
Services   29   32      36   40    44 33 
 Source: Calculated from Ghana Statistical Services data in Quarterly Digest of Statistics, various issues, ISSER (2002). 
 
The declining share of agriculture after 1983 did not necessarily signal structural change in 
the economy. (See Table 1.2). Much of the change observed in the data coincided with a 
poorly documented national accounts rebasing exercise in 1994, and so may be 
exaggerated. We also note that much of the increase in services was drawn from the 
relatively lower-order service sectors, notably wholesale and retail trade, and also 
restaurants and hotels.  Again, while the shares of mining and construction in GDP have 
increased over the last decade, manufacturing has not done the same.  
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Table 1.3: GDP by Sector at 1993 Constant Prices, 1997–2004 (% of Total) 
Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Agriculture of which: 36.7 36.5 36 35.9 35.9 36.1 36.7 
    Agriculture and Livestock 24.9 25 24.3 24.5 24.70 24.7 24.6 
   Cocoa Production and Marketing 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.27 3.5 4.2 
   Forestry and Logging 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.58 3.6 3.6 
   Fishing 5 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.35 4.4 4.3 
      
Industry of which: 25.1 25.2 25.2 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.7 
   Mining and Quarrying 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.3 5.25 5.2 5.2 
   Manufacturing 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.1 9.15 9.1 9.0 
   Electricity and Water 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.89 2.56 2.5 2.5 
   Construction 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.9 7.96 8.0 8.1 
  
Services of which: 29 29 29.7 29.9 30 29.8 29.5 
   Transport, Storage and Communication 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.87 4.9 4.9 
   Wholesale & Retail Trade,  6.7 6.8 6.8 7 6.96 7.0
      Restaurants and Hotels       
6.9 
   Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.33 4.3
      Business       
4.3 
   Government Services 10.8 10.7 11.0 11.0 11.00 10.8 10.7 
   Community, Social and Personal  1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.93 1.9
       Services       
1.9 
   Producers of Private Non–Profit Services 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.89 0.9 0.9 
  
Sub Total 90.8 90.8 90.9 90.7 90.7 90.9 90.9 
Indirect Taxes 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.27 9.1 9.1 
GDP in Purchaser’s Value 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100 
Source: Bank of Ghana Statistical Bulletin 
 
The external trade sector has only seen marginal changes in many years. The composition 
of exports was hardly changed, until very recently.  Since the mid-eighties, trade as a share 
of GDP has increased sharply due to more liberal trade and exchange rate policies, the 
rehabilitation of cocoa and gold production, and an increase in the share of non-traditional 
exports in the total. These non-traditional exports are mostly agricultural or processed 
agricultural products, including pineapples, yams, wood products, cocoa products, canned 
tuna and oil palm products. 
 
Considering that manufacturing remains the weakest link in Ghana’s economic growth it is 
not surprising that considerable attention is paid to the behaviour of firms in a difficult 
macroeconomic environment. This is analyzed in this volume by Wolf and Sarpong (2005). 
They proceed from the hypothesis that firms that are successful exporters will invest more 
and that firms that invest more are more likely to export, such that a strong relationship 
between export performance and investment behaviour at the firm level is expected to 
complement market access in diversifying Ghana’s exports. To test this proposition for 
Ghana, Wolf and Sarpong (2005) use probit regressions, a simultaneous equation model on 
a 2003 survey of a stratified sample of 100 enterprises in Ghana to analyse the factors that 
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influence the investment and exporting behaviour of firms. They also investigate the 
different factors that influence the investment and export decisions in different sectors. The 
results of the study present a mixed bag of findings. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, no 
significant positive relationship is established between exporting and investment. They 
explain the negative relationship that they observe with difficult access to capital. On the 
other hand they find that younger firms, larger firms and more efficient firms are more 
likely to invest and more likely to export. 
 
The issue of finance for development is definitely important in the campaign to change 
economic structure. According to Buchs and Mathisen (2005), a competitive banking 
system is a prerequisite for ensuring that banks operate as credible forces for financial 
intermediation, channeling savings into investment and thereby fostering higher economic 
growth. They argue that the structure, as well as the other market characteristics, constitute 
an indirect barrier to entry into the Ghanaian banking system and thereby shield the large 
profits of bank. Buchs and Mathisen present an overview of Ghana’s banking sector in 
which the three largest banks account for 55% of the total assets of the banking system. 
Despite the tightening of monetary policy in 2001, domestic credit to the private sector 
remained at around 10% of GDP which is regarded as low, even by African standards. In 
contrast, Ghanaian banks’ pretax returns on assets and equity are rated among the highest 
in Africa (6.1% in 2002).  
 
By applying panel data to variables derived from the Panzer and Rosse (1987) analytical 
framework; Buchs and Mathisen (2005) find evidence of a non-competitive (monopolistic 
competition) market structure in the Ghanaian banking system that hampers financial 
intermediation. They identified the following factors as key obstacles to competition: 
persistent financing of government needs to the detriment of the private sector; high 
investment cost; barriers to competition on interest revenues; and losses on the loan 
portfolio. The key recommendations that they make to improve financial intermediation 
include achieving effective fiscal adjustments and a rigorous enforcement of creditor rights 
by addressing institutional lapses in financial regulations and judicial reviews of Ghana’s 
legal structures.  
 
A different approach to discussing the financial sector, but which leads to similar ideas 
about how to make the sector more effective is provided by Steel and Andah (2005). In 
analysing and assessing how policy, legal and the regulatory framework for the sector have 
affected and been influenced by the development of rural and micro finance institutions 
(RMFIs) in Ghana, particularly in terms of the range of institutions and products available, 
their financial performance and outreach, Steel and Andah argue that the adoption of 
business rules on different tier basis reflects Bank of Ghana’s growing understanding of 
MFIs and NBFIs. Steel and Andah (2005) discuss the extent to which a flexible regulatory 
environment can encourage innovation, while a diversity of RMFIs and products can serve 
different market niches not reached by commercial banks. They also consider the point at 
which special legislation may be needed; whether to facilitate commercialization and 
sustainability of the rural and micro finance (RMF) industry or to protect deposits and 
ensure the stability of the financial system.  However, while Ghana’s approach has fostered 
a wide range of both formal and informal RMFIs, it has not as yet been very successful in 
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achieving strong financial performance, significant scale, and true commercialization of 
microfinance. Steel and Andah (2005) observe that maintaining the different tier system 
requires substantial investment in the Apex Bank, in supervision and training and in 
strengthening the capacity to make good use of the liquidity being released. In sum, the 
biggest hurdle lies in finding the right balance between ease of entry for greater outreach, 
prudential regulations to enhance sustainability and monitoring capacity.      
 
The poor reach of financial services is further highlighted in a contribution on savings by 
Quartey and Blankson (2005). They discuss the issue of poor mobilization of resources in 
an unstable environment and argue that despite the reform, including financial sector 
liberalization, Ghana still experiences low savings. They attribute this to a combination of 
micro and macroeconomic, as well as political factors. Noting that very few studies have 
been conducted into savings behavior in Ghana (most concentrating on aggregate savings 
with hardly any on households), Quartey and Blankson use data from the Ghana Living 
Standard Surveys (GLSS III and IV) to argue from the standpoint that macro-financial 
policies have no significant effect on household savings in Ghana. They further use a 
descriptive approach to discuss broad developments in domestic saving and monetary 
policies while they employ a logit regression analysis to estimate the coefficients of the 
determinants of household domestic savings and to compare the marginal effects of two 
time spans precisely 1991/92 and 1998/99.  Generally, Quartey and Blankson conclude that 
macro-financial sector policies pursued between 1991/92 and 1998/99 did not have 
appreciable effects on household savings. Secondly, young persons and the aged on 
average had higher savings balances than the working population, contrary to the life cycle 
hypothesis. Interestingly, while people living in own houses saved less than those living in 
rented accommodation, the study also confirmed that households with a higher average 
propensity to consume save less. Lastly, the fact that the average propensity to consume 
has increased in Ghana after years of financial sector liberalization is seen to confirm the 
ineffectual nature of macro-financial sector policies over the years.  
 
 
4.  Poverty and Social Development 
 
The extent and depth of poverty are generally to be seen as outcomes of the absence of 
effort to change the structure of the economy over several decades (Aryeetey and McKay 
2004). The absence of change has left Ghana quite dependent on its resource endowments 
mainly and with that has come the associated vulnerability. The rigid economic structure 
with a rapidly growing population may be expected to create problems for any economy, 
thus leading to poverty among the population.   
 
There is currently a lot of data on poverty and inequality in Ghana after several surveys 
over the last two decades. Thus conventional administrative data has been supplemented 
with survey data and qualitative or participatory assessments of poverty. Some of the 
important qualitative sources are the participatory poverty assessment carried out in several 
rural and urban communities in 1994/95 (Norton et al., 1995) and the Ghana Voices of the 
Poor study (Kunfaa, 1999). 
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What both the qualitative and quantitative assessments indicate is a large number of people 
that are poor and deprived. There are some important patterns to poverty in Ghana, mainly 
by geographic location, with the worst cases of deprivation in the northern savannah region 
compared to the south. The GLSS data of 1998/99 showed that 42.2% of all households in 
Ghana in the lowest income quintile were located in the rural savannah, even though this 
area accounted for only 20.6% of total population. In the 1992-98 period Aryeetey and 
McKay (2004) report that the headcount income poverty fell from 51.7% of the population 
to 39.5%, with strong geographic and other patterns. Inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient increased slightly over the same period. (See Table 1.4). 
 
The overall rate of poverty reduction over the period suggests a growth elasticity of poverty 
incidence of 0.98, a figure which is comparable to other African countries (Christiaensen et 
al.. 2003). But there are pockets in southern Ghana with high levels of poverty and 
deprivation, particularly in the Central Region. The Ghana poverty map (Coulombe 2005) 
also shows important variations within localities, so that less poor districts within the very 
poor northern regions and a number of poor districts in coastal areas in the south have 
comparable poverty levels. The data shows a strong urban-rural differential in poverty 
indicators, with deprivation being substantially higher in rural areas. Poverty also has 
important gender dimensions, with most indicators showing that women face higher levels 
of deprivation compared to men, and levels of income poverty are higher among 
households with higher dependency ratios. Landlessness, historically not a major problem 
in Ghana, has become an increasingly important issue underlying poverty and insecurity in 
peri-urban areas (Government of Ghana, 2003). Few of the poor work in non-agricultural 
wage employment, with the large majority working in small-scale agriculture. The majority 
of the latter produce food crops, though there are also significant numbers producing cocoa 
and other export crops that are poor. 
 
Table 1.4: Summary Information on Changes in Income Poverty and Inequality at the 
National Level 
 1991/92 1998/99 Changes, 
1991/92 to 
1998/99 
    
Average value of income standard of living measure 
(from survey; millions of cedis per person per year, 
constant prices) 
1.44 1.78 3.1% p.a. 
Change in real consumption per capita (national 
accounts) 
  2.9% p.a. 
Gini coefficient 0.373 0.388  
Poverty headcount index (per cent) 51.7 39.5 -12.2 
Growth elasticity of poverty headcount index   0.98 
Source: Aryeetey and McKay 2004 
 
In the Coulombe (2005) presentation of the poverty map (this volume), he discusses 
extensively the methodology and documents the numerous advantages that both the Ghana 
Census 2000 and the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS IV) provide to policy makers 
and users in developing poverty profiles and maps at district and sub-district levels in 
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Ghana. The methodology takes advantage of detailed information found in the survey and 
the exhaustive coverage of the census which makes it possible to compute standard errors 
of the different poverty estimates and therefore conveys a notion of reliability of estimates 
arrived at. Significantly, researchers could easily use it with some fair degree of accuracy 
to determine the relationship between poverty distribution in Ghana and different socio-
economic outcomes. 
 
Appiah-Kubi, Oduro and Senadza (2005) provide a poverty profile of Ghana using mainly 
GLSS IV data and estimate the incidence of vulnerability in Ghana using a cross-sectional 
approach. With various conceptualizations of vulnerability, the authors argue that Ghanaian 
households and individuals vulnerable to poverty include both poor and non-poor, and are 
estimated to be 49.5 % of the total population in 1998/99. They suggest the need for further 
investigation, both quantitative and qualitative, of poverty dynamics in Ghana to provide 
information for more rigorous analysis. They advocate the use of public policy to provide a 
stable macroeconomic policy framework within which agents operate and provide safety 
nets (welfare enhancing) for households and individuals experiencing shock (vulnerability) 
to fall on for recovery. In this light, they regard the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS) as well intentioned to address the plight of the vulnerable and excluded but suggest 
that it falls short on providing assistance to food crop farmers to enhance their production. 
A major step forward will be to take measures to enable food crop farmers cope with the 
perennial long dry season. 
 
The practical link between macroeconomic policies and poverty may be looked at through 
the lens of inflation and how it affects the poor. The chapter by McKay and Sowa (2005) 
contends that given the extent to which the vast majority of households in Ghana rely on 
the market for their purchase of key commodities including food (52% of household 
income), inflation, which has averaged 25% per annum since 1983, is clearly important to 
both poor and non-poor persons. Whether or not it hits the poor harder depends on whether 
they are less able to hedge themselves against inflation compared to wealthier groups; and 
on whether they face a higher rate of inflation. The authors made the assertion that 
although the large majority of households in Ghana do not have ready access to 
conventional means of hedging against inflation through savings and investments, there is 
no evidence yet that they face a systematically higher – or lower – inflation rate than the 
non-poor. They also suggest that at the broad commodity category level, consumption 
baskets in Ghana are remarkably uniform across income groups. There are some important 
differences in the composition of the consumption basket at the individual commodity 
level. The initial calculations suggest that the choice of weighting method for computing 
inflation rates makes a difference.  In the few cases considered, the authors conclude that 
there is no evidence to suggest that the poor face a systematically higher (or lower) 
inflation rate than the non-poor. They finally observe that in rural Ghana consumption from 
own production is important for many households and this provides them with some 
insurance against inflation as such transactions do not involve the exchange of money.   
 
There is considerable discussion about whether government programmes to tackle poverty 
actually reach the poor. Tsekpo and Jebuni (2005) explore the relationship between budget 
implementation and poverty reduction and observe that transfers to the local government 
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sector show sensitivity to the poverty reduction agenda of central government. This is in 
spite of the fact that some budgetary allocations, commonly referred to as the District 
Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), are not necessarily directed at ‘targeted’ poor groups. 
There are further targeting problems as some programmes of the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS) benefit wealthier commercial farmers more than they do poor subsistence 
farmers. Even where the GPRS targets the poor, there are sometimes no funds for project 
implementation. Tsekpo and Jebuni also question the reliability of data which suggests a 
shift in spending from administration to capital expenditure since a reclassification of 
expenditure items might have disguised the true picture. They point out however that data 
from the CWIQ 2003 survey results might be more useful in establishing that budgetary 
allocations may be moving increasingly in favour of the poor.  
 
When the poor fail to secure access to public services, there is a higher likelihood that they 
will adopt survival techniques that may sometimes be costly to society. Self-medication is 
one such technique and has been reported to be on the increase and leading to major 
problems. Van den Boom et al. (2005) that the high prevalence of self-medication in Ghana 
(50%) may be attributed to distance from health facilities and doctors,  (one in every four 
Ghanaians lives beyond a 15-km radius of a doctor) and high cost of seeing a doctor ($10 
compared to $1.5 for self-medication). With a current doctor/population  ratio of 1:16,000 
(denominator reduces to 11,000 when private doctors are included), the simulated 
utilization patterns of the authors indicate possible demand of an additional 15-20% of 
doctors, which may further worsen the burden on conventional healthcare and pose a huge 
challenge An option proposed is to improve the quality of self medication through 
certification and training of chemical sellers, traditional healers, unsupervised druggists and 
medicine peddlers. Van den Boom et al. (2005) suggest the exploration of innovative ways 
to encourage private contributions to augment Ghana’s heavily subsidised health sector and 
thereby reduce self-medication.  
 
 
5. The State, Institutions and Socio-Economic Development 
 
If we defined the state as “a set of institutions that possess the means of legitimate 
coercion, exercised over a defined territory and its population, known as society”, then the 
role that each institution plays in bringing more rapid development to that society should be 
paramount. 
 
The state’s role in development is changing throughout the world, with an increasing focus 
on effectiveness. The factors that influence the state’s effectiveness vary from place to 
place and similar structures may lead to different outcomes. But the fact that the state is 
central to the development process remains largely unchallenged. Economic and political 
reforms are redefining the role of the state, but the process often remains ad hoc in poor 
countries, including Ghana. 
 
The use of policy as a tool for delivering the state’s development output is challenged by 
the limitations of the state and its institutional capacities. Public policy must recognize this 
and adapt accordingly. The history of failed or failing states prior to reform in many 
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countries prompted change, which itself is being questioned for possibly having gone too 
far.  
 
In trying to offer explanations for why two decades of reform have not dealt adequately 
with the problems of macroeconomic stability, Aryeetey and Fosu (2005) argue that the 
problems could be attributed to the continuing presence of institutional constraints in the 
mobilization of resources and their allocation. The state and its institutions had been 
weakened by the many years of neglect, and the reforms did not deal adequately with those 
problems. While political instability may have been contained, this was achieved at some 
economic cost. Weak governments are more likely to experience slippages in 
macroeconomic programs, as has been seen with vote-buying public expenditures in the 
last decade. Corruption and other institutional inadequacies increase the transaction cost for 
all economic endeavours, and this is seen clearly in Ghana. The end result was that policy 
reform slowed down in the 1990s and growth stagnated, although at a higher level than in 
most countries. The question then became what it would take for growth to accelerate once 
again and to be sustained. The answer from Aryeetey and Fosu is to continue with new 
programs to strengthen the institutions that will support market reforms, mindful of 
complementarities in the public and private roles in bringing about investment and making 
such investment productive. 
 
Killick (2005) provides another angle to the discussion of the role of the state and 
institutions. He argues that the economic achievements of the 1980s and 1990s were 
“substantial and sufficient to refute any suggestion that existing inflexibilities make it 
impossible to achieve change”. But he observes major weaknesses and suggests that greater 
flexibility would have brought more rapid gains. The first reason he provides for the 
continuing difficulties is that the state sector remains large beyond its competence. He 
illustrates with the difficulties associated with the management of the budget. Killick sees 
the weaknesses of the civil service and the difficulty in reforming also as major obstacles 
better growth rates.  He maintains that successive governments have not able to strengthen 
the public service and its ability to deliver on development promises because of the neo-
patrimonial model of politics. He does not see democracy as the panacea, as “the logic of 
competitive politics remains unfavourable to decisive action on public service reform”.  
 
Killick suggests that many of the most important constraints on faster economic progress in 
Ghana go well beyond the confines of economics and require attention to improvements in 
political and social structures. Improvements in the democratic environment should be 
utilized to reform and strengthen the pubic service.  He calls for major reductions in the 
economic role of the state in view of the fact that the state has not shown an ability to 
deliver services and development in a sustained manner. 
 
We recognize the growing perception in Ghana that in order to reinvigorate state 
institutions with proper incentives, there must be effective rules and regulations, as indeed 
there should be greater competition for the state as well as increased citizen voice and 
partnership (Aryeetey 2005). The strengthened public sector will ensure in order to achieve 
poverty reduction that did not compromise growth poverty reduction is anchored within a 
clear macroeconomic framework. In recognizing the productivity problems facing the 
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economy and society, human resource development institutions will have to respond to the 
changing demand for skills, without losing sight of the need to make the entire society 
literate. Monitoring mechanisms for public expenditures must be developed and 
strengthened to ensure that such expenditures reach their targets and generate the expected 
outputs. This requires that decentralization should lead to a more open system of 
governance and empower districts to generate additional resources from within. 
 
In assessing the impact of the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction Asante and 
Ayee (2005) argue that poverty reduction was central to the decentralization programme in 
Ghana from its inception as various initiatives such as Programme of Action to Mitigate the 
Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1987, the Productivity and Income Generation 
Fund in 1996 and lately the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Funds in 2002 and the 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) in 2003 formed part of the decentralization 
programme. Rather, Asante and Ayee note that it is the poor implementation (function of 
decentralization) of the above poverty initiatives that accounts for a low impact of 
decentralization on poverty reduction. Moreover, even though the paper found that 
decentralization has an impact on poverty reduction, this impact is dependent on certain 
variables. It is not sufficient just to look at any decentralization type, such as political 
decentralization, in isolation, when assessing the impact of decentralization on poverty 
reduction. Political, administrative and fiscal decentralization need to be considered 
simultaneously and the sequencing and pace of the different types of decentralization seem 
to play an important role. Asante and Ayee recommend an efficient local government that 
effectively combines strategies of political empowerment, resource mobilization and 
enhanced service delivery; addressing institutional bottlenecks that inhibit coordination 
between central and local government; and lastly renewed political commitment by 
government to fully decentralize irrespective of its political, technical risks and trade offs. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As Ghana enters its second half century, we are faced with a paradox. Despite a solid 
transition to democracy in the political situation, despite recorded recovery in the last 
fifteen years from the economic malaise of the two decades preceding, and despite 
reductions in measured poverty, there is widespread perception of failure of the economic 
and political system in delivering improving living standards to the population. We have 
argued in this essay that policy makers and analysts have to confront this perception and 
examine it. The papers in this volume call for a deeper examination of the macro level data 
on growth and on poverty. A sectoral and regional disaggregation reveals weaknesses in 
the levels and composition of private investment, in the generation of employment, in 
sectoral diversification, and in the distribution of the benefits of growth. Income poverty 
has declined, but inequality has increased in various dimensions. At the same time, the 
push for decentralization and for better allocation, monitoring and implementation of 
public expenditure has raised more questions than it has answered. These are the challenges 
that Ghana faces if it is to fulfill the bright promise of its independence in 1957. The papers 
in this volume set out an analytical agenda that we hope will help in laying the ground 
work for the path that the nation’s policy makers will have to steer on the road to 2057. 
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